Two Concepts of the Subject in Modern East Asian Ethics: The Approach to Philosophical Ethics in Watsuji Tetsuro, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan

Title

Two Concepts of the Subject in Modern East Asian Ethics: The Approach to Philosophical Ethics in Watsuji Tetsuro, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan

Author

Stephan SCHMIDT

Page

145-160

DOI

Abstract

The present essay inquires into the philosophical ethics of Watsuji Tetsuro,　Mou Zongsan, and Tang Junyi, thereby trying to initiate a dialogue between two　important strands of modern East Asian philosophy, namely New Confucianism　and the Kyoto School. The starting point is a commonly shared focus on the task　at hand: All three philosophers discussed here think it imperative to emancipate philosophical ethics from the dominating paradigm of Western ontology and　epistemology. To this end, they establish a categorical distinction between the　moral subject and the epistemological subject – shutai and shukan in Watsuji,　daode zhuti and renshi zhuti in New Confucianism – and try to base philosophical ethics exclusively on the former. This essay compares both sets of　distinctions in order to work out their shared assumptions on man's moral nature　as well the criticism they entail with regard to Western ethics. In a second step,　the essay aims to explore the concept of man in which both approaches to moral philosophy are being grounded. Here, the focus is on Watsuji's concepts of ningen (human being-in-between) and jita fuji (non-duality of Self and Other) as　well as Mou Zongsan's insistence on the possibility of human self-transcendence　(ren sui you xian er ke wu xian). While cognizant of the subtle differences　involved, the essay maintains that both thinkers seek to develop conceptual　alternatives to what they perceive as the dominating modern Western self-image　of man qua individual.

Keyword

moral subject, epistemological subject, non－duality of Self and　Other

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